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Islam in Britain
This paper is based on a chapter in Islamophobia:
A Challenge For Us All, compiled and published
by the Runnymede Trust in 1997.
Summary of concerns
Islam in Britain, like Islam in the world, has
many facets. British Muslims have links with a
range of cultural, regional, ethnic and national
traditions, are involved in British society and
public life in a range of different ways, and
are influenced by a diversity of strands and schools
of thought within Islam itself. In Islam, as in
other faiths and systems of belief, there are
lively explorations and debates. Key topics include
the practical interpretation and application of
historic teachings; the distinction between what
is authentic, abiding and essential in the inherited
traditions as distinct from localised and an accident
of history; the training, responsibilities and
authority of leaders, and how to prepare the younger
generation for the future.
Our concerns in this chapter were well summarised
in a submission which we received from a local
authority which has many Muslim residents:
"Currently, many young South Asian Muslims
grapple with complex issues of identity of which
there are many facets, religion being one. Young
people may be influenced easily, as they are alienated
by society at large: also because of high unemployment
levels, a lack of educational opportunities and
racial issues. Fundamentalist groups may identify
this problem and exploit it by attempting to influence
disaffected youths ... The strategy to counteract
Islamophobia should offer genuine alternatives
to young people, and counteract the influence
of the extreme groups that seek to recruit young
impressionable individuals, usually leading them
up a blind alley and causing considerable damage
to the cause of Muslims and to the well-being
of British society." Our overall intention
in the chapter is twofold: to counter Islamophobic
assumptions that Islam is a single monolithic
system, without internal development, diversity
and dialogue, and to note and stress some of the
principal dangers which Islamophobia creates or
exacerbates for Muslim communities, and therefore
- as the quotation above stresses - for the well-being
of society as a whole. The chapter has two main
parts. First, we recall the development of Islam
in Britain over the centuries and, more especially,
over the last 30 years. Second, we look to the
future. We note in this connection two sets of
issues, to do respectively with pressures and
influences on young Muslims and the concerns and
agendas of Muslim leaders.
Historical summary
There has been a Muslim presence in Britain for
at least 300 years. The East India Company recruited
seamen from Yemen, Gujarat, Sind, Assam and Bengal,
known by the British as lascars, and a number
of these created small settlements in port towns
and cities in Britain, particularly London. Also
there were a number of Muslim businesses in the
nineteenth century, of which one of the best-known
was the fashionable, 'Mohamed's Baths' founded
in Brighton by Sake Deen Mohammed (1750-1851).
By 1842 three thousand lascars were visiting Britain
every year. Following the opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869, seamen originally from Yemen settled
in small communities in Cardiff, Liverpool, London,
South Shields and Tyneside and set up zawiyahs
(small mosques or prayer rooms).
These were the settings for the rites of nikah
(marriage), aqikah (birth), khitan (circumcision)
and Janazah (funeral), and for the celebration
of Eid. One of the best known leaders was Sheikh
al Hakimi, the imam of the Cardiff zawiyah, who
died in 1934. In the 1920s and 1930s a large proportion
of the South Asian seamen in the
merchant navy were Muslims and a number of them
stayed on in Britain after the second world war.
Many of these were the pioneers who, ten or so
years later, acted as initial points of contact
and sources of assistance for the substantial
chain migration from East and West Pakistan which
took place in the 1950s.
Also groups of Muslim intellectuals emerged in
Britain in the late nineteenth century. In the
period 1893 to 1908 a weekly journal, The Crescent,
was distributed from a base in Liverpool. Its
founder was William Henry Quilliam (known within
the Muslim community as Sheikh Abdullah Quilliam),
who by profession was a lawyer. He had become
a Muslim in 1887, following time spent in Algeria
and Morocco, and as author of the influential
The Faith of Islam was famous throughout the Islamic
world.
The Liverpool Muslim community set up the Islamic
Institute and the Liverpool Mosque in Broughton
Terrace, the Medina Home to care for children
and orphans, the Muslim College, and a Debating
and Literary Society with weekly meetings. In
1889 Britain's first mosque was established, at
Woking in Surrey. The funds for this were largely
provided by Shah Jehan, the ruler of Bhopal, India.
It was the base for the journal Muslim India and
the Islamic Review, re-named as the Islamic Review
in 1921, and people associated with it included
Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, a barrister originally from
Lahore who was seen by the British press as the
spiritual leader of all Muslims in Britain; Lord
Headley, who had worked in India as a civil engineer
and had converted to Islam in 1896; Rt Hon Syed
Ameer Ali, an Indian jurist and well-known Islamic
scholar, and to the present day the only Muslim
privy councillor ever; and Abdullah Yusuf Ali
and Marmaduke Pickthall) known for their influential
translations of the Qur'an.
In 1910, a group of prominent British Muslims,
including Lord Headley and Syed Ameer Ali, met
at a central London hotel and formally established
a fund, the London Mosque Fund, to finance the
building of a mosque in the capital. In 1941 the
East London Mosque Trust purchased three buildings
in Commercial Road, Stepney, and
converted them into London's first mosque. In
the 1980s the East London Mosque moved to its
present site in Whitechapel Road. In the meanwhile,
major purpose-built mosques had been built in
Birmingham, Glasgow and Manchester. The site for
the Regents Park mosque in London was donated
by the British government in 1944, in recognition
of a similar donation by the Egyptian government
to the Anglican community in Cairo. The building
itself was completed in 1977. The first large
mosque in Bradford was established in Howard Street
in 1959. Migration of Muslims to Britain on a
large scale began in the 1950s. In 1951 the probable
Muslim population of Britain was about 23,000.
Ten years later it was about 82,000 and by 1971
it was about 369,000(1). Migration mainly involved
men in the first instance. In Bradford in 1961,
for example, all but 81 of the 3,376 Pakistanis
in the city were men (2). Migration was encouraged
because there were major labour shortages in Britain,
particularly in the steel and textiles industries
of Yorkshire and Lancashire, and particularly
for night shifts. The workers who came were needed
by the economy, were actually or in effect invited
by employers, and as Commonwealth citizens had
full rights of entry and residence, and full civic
rights. They came principally from the Mirpur
district of Azad Kashmir in the country which
at that time was known as West Pakistan (now Pakistan),
or from the North West Frontier region of Pakistan,
or from the Sylhet area of north eastern Bangladesh,
known then as East Pakistan. In all of these largely
rural areas there was a longstanding tradition
of young men migrating for lengthy periods to
other countries or regions to raise money for
their families back home. The migration to Britain
was thus from a rural setting to an urban one
as well as to a different country and culture,
and involved an increase in wealth and income
as well as a change of occupation. In the case
of the Mirpuris it was affected by the building
of the Mangla Dam on the river Jhelum in the years
following independence, which displaced the populations
of some 250 villages, about 100,000 people altogether.
Many of the villagers received compensation money,
and some used a portion of this to finance their
journey to Britain.
Migrant workers came also from India. About a
sixth of the Indian-background people who came
to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s were Muslims,
a high proportion of these being from three districts
of Gujarat - Baroda, Surat and Bharuch. Gujarati-background
Muslims are influential in several northern cities
in Britain through their involvement in the management
and leadership of mosques, seminaries and Muslim
schools. About 15 per cent of the 150,000 Asians
who came from East African countries in the late
1960s and early 1970s were Muslims, with their
family roots in Pakistan or Gujarat. They included
Muslims belonging to the Ismaili tradition of
Islam. It was also in the 1970s that substantial
communities from Turkey and Middle Eastern and
North African countries began to be established.
Latterly, substantial Somali, Iranian, Arab and
Bosnian communities have been established in many
cities, and there are considerable numbers of
students from Malaysia. There are currently at
least five thousand converts to Islam within Britain(3),
about half of whom are of African-Caribbean origin.
Overall, we estimate the present Muslim population
of Britain to be somewhere between 1.2 and 1.4
million. The basis for this estimate is explained
in Appendix C .
More than half of all British Muslims have their
roots in Pakistan. (Table 1) shows the ten local
authority districts with the largest numbers of
Pakistani residents in 1991. Almost one in seven
(14%) of all Pakistanis, lived in Birmingham and
almost one in ten (9.5%) in Bradford. The other
main areas of settlement were Rochdale in Lancashire,
Kirklees in West Yorkshire, and Newham and Waltham
Forest in East London.
Table 1: the ten districts with the largest
numbers of Pakistani residents, 1991
|
Pakistani population |
% of Pakistanis in Britain |
| Birmingham |
66,085 |
13.9% |
| Bradford |
45,280 |
9.5% |
| Kirklees |
17,475 |
3.7% |
| Manchester |
15,371 |
3.2% |
| Newham |
12,504 |
2.6% |
| Rochdale |
11,054 |
2.3% |
| Glasgow City |
10,945 |
2.3% |
| Luton |
10,657 |
2.2% |
| Totals |
202.669 |
42.5% |
Table Two is similarly about the distribution
of the Pakistani population. It shows also, however,
the main areas of Bangladeshi settlement. It interestingly
links population distribution to parliamentary
constituencies, and estimates the numbers of voters
(i.e. persons over 18) at the time of the 1997
general election. It lists the parliamentary constituencies
in which at least 8% of the voters were of Pakistani
or Bangladeshi background.
Table 2: The constituencies in which voters
of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin constituted
at least 8% of the electorate in the 1997 general
election.
| Constituency |
Pakistani % |
Bangladeshi % |
Total % |
| Bethnel Green |
27.70 |
4.36 |
32.60 |
| Bow |
0.92 |
27.51 |
28.43 |
| Bradford West |
26.17 |
0.89 |
27.06 |
| Birmingham Ladywood |
15.57 |
4.56 |
21.13 |
| Bradford North |
11.48 |
1.88 |
12.36 |
| Luton South |
7.84 |
4.40 |
12.24 |
| East Ham |
8.10 |
5.03 |
13.13 |
| Rochdale |
11.03 |
1.72 |
12.75 |
| Poplar & Canning |
0.65 |
11.15 |
11.80 |
| Town |
10.19 |
0.68 |
10.87 |
| Birm'ham Hodge |
8.20 |
1.79 |
9.99 |
| Hill |
9.66 |
0.11 |
9.77 |
| Manchester Gorton |
6.50 |
3.20 |
9.70 |
| Slough |
8.91 |
0.57 |
9.48 |
| Batley & Spen. |
9.44 |
0.01 |
9.45 |
| Walthamstow |
5.14 |
3.65 |
8.79 |
| Pendle |
8.28 |
0.04 |
8.32 |
| West Ham |
8.27 |
0.04 |
8.31 |
Source: Ethnic Minority Data Archive: University
of Warwick.
The age-profile of South Asian communities in
Britain is different from that of the majority
population. A higher proportion is under twenty
and a lower proportion is over sixty. Because
of these demographic facts, the communities are
bound to increase in size over the next twenty
years, both absolutely and relatively. By the
year 2001 there are likely to be over 700,000
people of Pakistani background in Britain, of
whom two thirds will be British-born (4). It has
been estimated that the Pakistani population will
eventually stabilise towards the year 2020 at
about 900,000, and the Bangladeshi population
at about 360,000(5). The total Muslim population
at that time is likely to be approaching 2,000,000.
The development of Muslim identities
In the early days most Pakistani migrants to
Britain saw themselves as temporary visitors who
would one day return to their country of origin.
By the 1960s, however, they began to see themselves
as settlers rather than as temporary residents.
They established families whose future, it was
increasingly entirely clear, was going to be spent
in Britain. A major spur to permanent settlement
was the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962,
for it was as a direct result of this that families
had to choose, in effect, between being together
in Britain or divided for lengthy periods between
Britain and Pakistan. In five years between 1961
and 1966 the Pakistani population grew by over
400 per cent, from about 25,000 to 120,000. Between
1973
and 1981 a further 82,000 people came as settlers,
almost all of them being the dependants of men
already here.
The voucher system introduced by the Act consolidated
kinship and friendship patterns. It also involved
the issuing of 'B vouchers', as they were known,
for people with professional backgrounds, and
contributed therefore to the more rapid creation
of a Muslim middle-class than would otherwise
have happened. In the period 1965-1967 vouchers
were issued to 1,264 doctors from Pakistan, 577
teachers and 632 engineers and scientists. South
Asian Muslims also created a wide range of small
businesses, of which the 8,500 or so Bangladeshi
restaurants up and down the country (usually referred
to confusingly as 'Indian' restaurants) are particularly
well-known to non-Muslims. Incidentally, the Bangladeshi
catering industry now employs more people (about
60,000) than steel, coal and shipbuilding combined,
and has a yearly turnover of £l .5 billion
(6).
The spur for self-employment in the service sector
was provided by the restructuring of manufacturing
industries in the 1970s, and the disappearance
of many of the jobs in northern Britain for which
South Asians had originally been recruited. It
was affected also by religious and cultural factors.
A survey in the 1990s found that two thirds of
self-employed Pakistani people mentioned that
being their own boss meant it was easier for them
to perform their religious duties, and suggested
that their strong religious faith gave them confidence
to set up on their own despite a lack of formal
qualifications and poor access to finance. (7)
As both a reflection and a reinforcement of the
transition to seeing themselves as settlers, Pakistanis
and Bangladeshis established in the 1960s a wide
range of community organisations. They began at
the same time to be more self-consciously Muslim
than previously in their sense of identity, and
more observant in the practice of their faith.
Factors affecting this strengthening of religious
belief and practice included:
- The desire to build a sense of corporate identity
and strength in a situation of material disadvantage,
and in an alien and largely hostile surrounding
culture;
- The desire, now that communities contained
both children on the one hand and elders on
the other, to keep the generations together,
and to transmit traditional values to children
and young peopl
- The desire for inner spiritual resources to
withstand the pressures of fascism and Islamophobia,
and the threat to South Asian culture and customs
posed by western materialism and permissiveness.
Further, the choice of Muslim as a self-definition
involved a defiant rejection of racist stereotypes
in the majority population ("No more Paki.
Me a Muslim," says a character in a novel
set in the 1980s (8)), an opposition to 'Western'
values ("pleasure and self-absorption isn't
everything," the character continues), the
shedding of an identity based on a specific country
or region of parental origin, and the embracing
of an identity which was seen on the contrary
as international and global, surpassing both Britain
and South Asia. Researchers at the Policy Studies
Institute in the mid 1990s asked a wide range
of British people about the importance of religion
in their lives. 74% of the Muslim respondents
said that religion was 'very important'. This
compared with around 45% for Hindus and Sikhs,
and only 11% for white people who described themselves
as belonging to the Church of England. Amongst
Muslim men over the age of 35, four in five reported
that they visit a mosque at least once every week.
The increased influence of Islam in the politics
of Pakistan and Bangladesh in the 1970s, and the
increased influence in international affairs of
oil-exporting countries, most of which were Muslim,
contributed to Muslim self-confidence and assertiveness
within Britain. In addition, a sense of community
strength grew through the 1980s from successful
local campaigns to assert Muslim values and concerns,
for example for halal food to be served in schools
and hospitals, and from the extremely high-profile
campaign to protest against the insulting vilification
of Islam, as Muslims in Britain almost unanimously
saw it, perpetrated by Salman Rushdie's The Satanic
Verses.
The building of mosques
Before 1964 only seven new mosques had been registered
in Britain. But in 1964 itself a further seven
were registered and over the next decade there
were about eight new registrations each year.
From 1974 onwards new registrations were running
at 25-30 a year (9). The creation of mosques was
both a cause and a consequence of increased Muslim
observance and self-definition. In the first instance
most mosques were converted from existing buildings.
But increasingly from the 1970s onwards they were
purpose-built. In autumn 1996 it was estimated
that there were 613 mosques in Britain, of which
96 were purpose-built (10). In most of them the
imam is from a South Asian background and there
is a majority of South Asian people on the mosque
management committee.
Mosques are essentially places for prayer. In
all the larger ones there are five acts of corporate
worship each day, every day. The jum'ah prayers
and sermon at noon on Fridays are particularly
important for Muslims and involve large numbers
of worshippers. Some of the larger mosques in
Britain operate also as cultural centres and community
centres, and as vehicles for social welfare and
philanthropy, since it is through the mosques
that zakat (Muslim alms-giving) is channelled.
They organise visits to the sick and bereaved,
and play a significant role in providing religious
education classes in order that children may be
nurtured in the Muslim faith, and that Muslim
beliefs and culture may therefore be transmitted
and maintained. Latterly a number of imams in
Britain have begun to assume pastoral roles, broadly
similar to those of a Christian chaplain, in hospitals,
prisons and universities.
In the 1960s mosques such as the Howard Street
Mosque m Bradford catered for Muslims of all traditions,
ethnicities and geographical regions. But as communities
became more established and confident, they began
to define and develop their religious identity
in terms of Islam's principal strands and schools
of thought, particularly those influential in
South Asia. Also they began to reflect and re-create
cultural, regional and linguistic diversity in
South Asia and indeed in the worldwide Muslim
community (ummah) generally. Coordinating organisations
such as the Council for Mosques in Bradford and
similar organisations in other cities, and national
bodies such as the UK Action Committee on Islamic
Affairs (UKACIA) and the recently formed Muslim
Council of Britain (MCB), all determinedly non-sectarian,
have helped the diversity to be dynamic rather
than divisive, and have consistently stressed
that Islam is a single world wide faith and that
Muslims belong essentially to the world wide community
of the ummah. However, anyone wishing to understand
the dynamism, and through such understanding to
have a sense of the future for British Muslims,
and of how Islam in Britain is likely to develop,
needs to appreciate some of the diversity within
Islam as well as its essentials and fundamentals.
Most non-Muslims know if they know anything at
all about Islam, that the religion has two main
strands, Shi'a and Sunni. They may know also that
these strands began to develop within a hundred
years of the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632;
that Shi'a Muslims are in the majority in Iran
and Iraq (though not in Iraq's government and
ruling elite) but not in any other Muslim country;
that about nine tenths of all Muslims in the world
are Sunni, and that this proportion is even higher
amongst South Asian Muslims in Britain. They realise,
it follows from these points, that to understand
religious influences affecting the development
of Islam in Britain it is more important to appreciate
different strands within Sunni Islam, particularly
in South Asia, than differences between Sunni
and Shi'a. But most non-Muslims in Britain have
only the haziest notion or no notion at all, of
what these are. The key distinctions between Barelwis
and Deobandis, for example, and the key features
of the Tablighi Jamaat and Jamaat-i-lslami movements,
are a closed book to most non- Muslims.(11) It
is not the task of this report to elucidate these
distinctions and features. There is clearly a
need, however, for an authoritative brief account
for non-Muslims of Islam's principal strands and
schools of thought. Such an account would valuably
counter the false belief that Islam is monolithic,
without internal diversity and debate. Someone
with extensive experience of teaching about Islam
within church settings in Britain told us that
he finds that there is no more powerful way of
dispelling the image of Islam as monolithic and
threatening than that of explaining the rich diversity
in Islam's various strands and schools of thought.
Pressures and influences on young Muslims
Young British Muslims, like all other young British
people, shape their identities within parameters
set by the wider world. They seek a sense of their
own worth and contribution within family, peer-group,
neighbourhood and community affairs, and within
the institutions, systems and organisations (particularly
those relating to education and employment) to
which they belong. The influences and pressures
on them come from a range of different, often
conflicting, directions. In the notes which follow
we recall briefly seven of these.
1) The family. Muslim families, like all families,
vary in their approaches to child rearing and
in the freedoms they permit to teenagers, and
vary in their own loyalties and sense of belonging.
Young Muslims, like all young people at all times
and in all places, may be impatient or critical
regarding some of their parent's loyalties and
priorities.
2) The mosque. Up to the age of 14 most Muslim
children attend a local mosque school. The pedagogical
style is typically different from that which they
encounter at their mainstream school, for it puts
much emphasis on learning the Qur'an in Arabic
by heart and on oral repetition (tartil/tajwid),
and gives relatively low priority, in the first
instance, to discussion and intellectual understanding.
The imams and other teachers at the mosque schools
mostly received their own education, both secular
and religious, outside Britain. There is an increasingly
widespread perception in Muslim communities that
imams are not equipped by their own training to
help young British Muslims cope with issues such
as unemployment, racism and Islamophobia, drugs,
the attractions of Western youth culture, and
so on. By and large mosques do not provide educational
activities for young people over the age of 14,
and thus are not well placed to support them if
and when they question, as many in their mid and
late teens are inclined to do, the pedagogy which
they encountered at the mosque school and the
interpretations of Islam which were presented.
3) Muslim youth organisations which seek to promote
understanding of the Muslim faith within the setting
of a non-Muslim country such as Britain.
Their publications are in English, as are the
meetings which they organise. For many young Muslims
there is a disparity, they feel, between what
they hear and learn from such organisations and
what they were told at the mosque school or by
their families (12). At the very time that they
become more devout and observant in their own
personal Muslim beliefs and in their determination
to live according to Muslim principles, they feel
that the mosques and imams are often unable to
respond to their particular needs and concerns.
Later we quote from a recent essay competition
for Muslim students, to show the kinds of religious,
social and ethical issues which concern them.
4) Extremist Muslim organisations.
These too use English in their publications and
meetings, and are implicitly or explicitly critical
of aspects of traditional Islam which they consider
to be cultural accretions rather than essential.
Also their discourse is frequently anti-western
and they have closed and hostile views of other
religions. Their references to Judaism and Israel
are indistinguishable from crude anti-Semitism.
Their phobic hostility to all things western is
a mirror image of western Islamophobia and indeed
helps to feed it. Their simplistic messages can
be attractive to young people, since they appear
at first sight to give a satisfactory picture
of the total world situation (the West is the
root of all evil) and appear to have a clear practical
agenda (resistance and struggle), However, they
have far fewer active supporters than the mainstream
media claim.
5) The Islamophobic messages of the mass media.
These often have the effect of undermining young
people's self-confidence and self-esteem, their
confidence in their parents and families, and
their respect for Islam. A young Muslim teacher
working in a secondary school wrote to us that
"Muslim youths of the third generation are
ignorant of their religious identity because of
the prejudice surrounding them. The distorted
image portrayed by the media is so profound, it
is believed by Muslim elders that 60-80% of young
Muslims will never practise Islam other than ...
rituals."
Islamophobia makes extremist organisations, however,
even more attractive. An editorial article in
a Muslim periodical has put the point as follows:
"For many youngsters, Islam is proving to
be a genuine way out, a way to make sense of the
bewildering maelstrom of currents surrounding
them. For many others, it is a reactionary grab
at something they see as a source of opposition.
The irony is that by demonising Muslims the mass
media is also erecting a romantic notion of opposition
to mainstream culture." (13)
6) The largely secular culture of mainstream
society, encountered through the education system
and the mass media, and in employment and training.
Mainstream western culture is largely indifferent
to all forms of religious commitment, not only
to Islam. Also, at the same time, it seems distinctively
hostile to Islam, since so many Muslims meet rejection
when they apply to mainstream employers for jobs,
and since so many are unemployed. The Policy Studies
Institute's recent research showed a clear decline
in religious observance amongst younger Muslims.
(14)
7) The street culture of the young people themselves.
There are trends amongst young British Muslims,
particularly those who are unemployed or who expect
to be unemployed, towards territoriality and gang
formation, and towards anti-social conduct, including
criminality. In the prison population of England
and Wales the numbers of Muslims increased by
40% in the period 1991-1995. Such trends exist
everywhere in the world where young people feel
dispossessed and disadvantaged. Amongst other
things social exclusion is a fertile seedbed for
extremists.
To be concerned about British Muslims is to be
concerned with Muslim youth, for around 70% of
all British Muslims are under the age of 25. We
have sketched above seven main directions in which
they are pulled, or by which they are repelled,
as they seek to make their way in the world. The
tensions, threats and attractions raise issues
for the whole adult generation - their parents
and relatives, their teachers, lecturers and youth
workers, and their religious and community leaders.
In a later chapter we consider the implications
for the mainstream education system. We continue
and conclude the present chapter by considering
the impact of Islamophobia on Muslim leaders and
elders. But first, here is an extract from an
essay competition, to show some of the debates
and discussions which young British Muslims have
with each other.
Questions for young Muslims
The following questions were set in an essay
competition organised in summer 1995 by the Federation
of Student Islamic Societies
1 "Islam is a restrictive and authoritarian
religion that prohibits individual freedom".
Defend the case of Islam.
2 Is membership of any particular Islamic group
a necessary condition for engaging in effective
da'wah (invitation to Islam)? What are the advantages
and disadvantages of being a member of a group
when giving da'wah?
3 Should Islam condone practices such as genetic
engineering, egg transplantation, etc, as examples
of scientific progress for the benefit of humanity,
or should such practices be condemned as giving
scientists the opportunity to play God?
4 Is democracy a hypocritical concept which has
no place in Islam as claimed by some, or is it
a misunderstood concept that is compatible with
Islam and something Muslims could benefit from.
5 Muslim communities in the UK have adopted and
display many different cultures originating from
the East and from the West. How much of this adoption
of cultures is correct and within Islamic rules
and regulations?
Tasks and concerns of Muslim leaders
In our consultation paper we asked whether Muslim
organisations and leaders have distinctive responsibilities
in relation to the overall task of combating Islamophobia.
Below we quote some of the responses to this question
which we received, drawing mainly on submissions
from Muslim individuals and organisations. First,
we cite some words of warning on this general
theme from one of the submissions which we received:
"Islamophobia is a classic demonstration
of the formula that 'prejudice + power = discrimination
'. We must recognise, therefore, that this issue,
like all racism, is the responsibility of those
with power, rather than a problem for the Muslim
communities to overcome themselves"
This warning cannot, in the present context,
be over-emphasised. Although Box 11 is addressed
to Muslim leaders its principal importance within
the framework of this report is in stressing points
which those with power in wider society need to
bear in mind when intending to help, and when
doing their best not to hinder, the tasks which
Muslim communities themselves undertake.
Tasks for Muslim organisations
Dispelling myths and misunderstandings
"We do not under-estimate the role Muslims
themselves must play in the process of generating
goodwill in the wider community. Racism and Islamophobia
have many similarities and the underlying cause
for both is only one - ignorance. Muslims are
aware that they must take the first initiative
to reach out to the society around them to dispel
the myths and misunderstandings."
A Muslim organisation in London
Accessing established power structures
"The ways in which Muslim opinion leaders
can assist are, in my view, the same as those
with influence in any other community, whether
the minority or majority. They need to assist
their communities to develop so that they can
access established power structures. They should
encourage participation in democratic politics
and encourage respect for the values of other
communities, recognising that life in all societies
requires some measure of compromise."
A city councillor in the West Midlands
Assurances of goodwill
"Muslim communities and their opinion leaders
have a responsibility to guide their followers
as to how they should react to cases of Islamophobia.
The Qur'anic teaching on this is quite clear:
(41:34) 'Repel evil with what is better; then
will he between whom and thee was hatred become
as it were thy friend and intimate' In respect
of other people they have the duty to speak out
and correct misapprehensions, as well as give
assurances of the goodwill of Muslims towards
others."
A national Muslim organisation
To educate themselves
"Muslims should be educated about British
culture and Islamic principles - how Islam can
be applied practically in modern day Britain...
Muslims must take responsibility to educate themselves
to reason and distinguish culture from Islam and
be able to apply principles of Islam to modern
day life. The problem has been compounded as the
imams have generally been called from the Indian
sub-continent with no understanding of issues
facing the British population and therefore have
been unable to properly guide and lead British
Muslims, especially the young".
A Muslim organisation in the West Midlands
Visibly active
"The Muslim community has a great responsibility
in promoting the teaching of Islam and its values.
Many mosques and Muslim organisations have dismally
failed because they do not have the vision, purposefulness
and cohesion to deal with the challenge of living
with others. To some extent, Muslims have contributed
to the negative image of Islam. Often some of
the opinion leaders have played to an eager media
gallery and have used intemperate language to
articulate knee-jerk reactions, alienating public
opinion in the process. Muslims must be visibly
active in the political, social, educational,
economic and cultural activities of the country.
Parents should actively encourage their children
towards such participation".
A national Muslim organisation
Both message and method
"There can be no doubt that Muslims have
an important, indeed pivotal, role in correcting
Islamophobia... Islam is both a message and a
method. For example, Muslims should resist responding
to provocation in kind but should repel evil,
in the words of the Qur'an, by 'that which is
better'. Reasoned discussion and persuasion is
ultimately the only way forward in promoting understanding
and cooperation."
A national Muslim organisation
Specific tasks which were mentioned to us, within
the approaches and perspectives outlined above,
included:
- creating and developing a national body to
represent British Muslims to government, and
to other public bodies;
- the production of more high quality books
about Islam for schools and libraries, and persuading
major publishers to employ Muslim writers for
this purpose
- taking steps to ensure that imams and other
religious leaders have training and expertise
in helping young British Muslims to cope with
the problems and pressures of modern secular
society;
- encouraging Muslims to train as teachers,
but only as teachers of religious education;
- undertaking training in media relations;
- providing awareness-raising seminars and training
for journalists;
- getting involved in making a range of TV and
radio programmes, and writing articles for the
press;
- setting up media monitoring projects, and
routinely complaining about inaccurate, misleading
or distorted coverage;
- setting up voluntary welfare projects to help
non-Muslims as well as Muslims;
- making common cause with non-Muslim organisations
to secular bodies;
- setting up Islamic financial institutions
to fund apprenticeships and training, and to
encourage more Muslims to start well-planned
business initiatives.
We hope that Muslim organisations will continue
to discuss and implement ideas such as those listed
above, and that they will receive assistance,
understanding and support from non-Muslims, as
appropriate. We recommend that Muslim organisations
should discuss this report and identify the recommendations
on which they themselves can take immediate initiatives.
Further, we recommend that both locally and nationally
Muslim organisations should press for the implementation
of the recommendations in this report.
Information about the full report from which
this extract is taken can be obtained from the
Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia
at bmicom@freenet.co.u.k. The report itself can
be ordered through any bookshop (ISBN 0 9022397-98-2).
A progress report entitled Addressing the Challenge
of Islamophobia, published by the Commission in
late 2001, can be downloaded as a PDF document
from elsewhere on this website.
Notes
1. Ceri Peach, "The Muslim population of
Great Britain', Ethnic and Racial Studies, ml
13 no 3, 1990.
2. Cited in Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain: religion,
politics and identity among British Muslims, I.B.
Tauris 1994, page 16.
3. Jargon Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe,
Edinburgh University Press, 1991, page 43.
4. As estimated by Muhammad Anwar, 1996, page
131.
5. Estimated by Roger Ballard and Virinder Singh
Kaira. The Ethnic Dimension of the 1991 Census,
pages 14 and 16.
6. Figures cited in an article by David Bowen,
Independent on Sunday, 3 March 1996.
7. Hilary Metcalfe Tariq Modood, Satnam Virdee,
Asian Self-Employment, Policy Studies Institute
1996.
8. The Black Album by Hanif Kureishi, Faber and
Faber 1995, page 107.
9. Figures given by Jorgen Nielsen, director
of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim
Relations. Birmingham, November 1991
.
10. Figures given by Sher Azam, formerly president
of the Bradford Council for Mosques, in the newspaper
promoting Islam Awareness Week, 23-29 September
1996.
11. These strands of thought are described in
detail by, for example, Philip Lewis (1994) and
Ron Greaves (1996). There are interesting references
also in Kepel (1997) and LeBor (1997). Full details
in the bibliography in Appendix D.
12. This point is discussed at length in 'British
Muslims and the Search for Religious Guidance'
by Philip Lewis, in J. Hinnells and W. Menski,
eds. From Generation to Generation: religious
reconstruction in the South Asian diaspora, Kegan
Paul 1997.
13. Quoted in a paper by the Revd Molly Kenyon,
The Bradford Disturbances: healing the wounds,
Bradford 1995. Also we draw on this paper in our
account of sources of pressure and influence on
the young.
14. Modood and Berthoud (1997), tables 9.9 and
9,13.
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